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*The New Far East.* By THOMAS F. MILLARD. (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons. 1906. Pp. xii, 319.)

*Paix Japonaise.* By LOUIS AUBERT. (Paris: A. Colin, 1906. Pp. 351.)

*The International Position of Japan as a Great Power.* By SEIGI G. HISHIDA. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1905. Pp. 289.)

Mr. Millard describes his book as a "digest of an accumulation of material and opinion, supplemented by a flavoring of my own views." This flavoring, which is quite pervasive, is in essence as follows: The favorable opinion to Japan in Great Britain and America is the result of clever manipulation. The war itself was carefully planned by the Japanese statesmen, Russia was taken unawares, and the Japanese people rushed to arms because "their minds had been adroitly played on for years." In the view of the author, the war was the result of an ambitious policy of expansion on the part of the Japanese statesmen. While Russia wanted peace, they forced her into war on the claim that their own national life was in danger. Though they solemnly acknowledged the independence of Korea, they immediately destroyed her neutrality and treated her practically as a conquered province. The author's interpretation of details is entirely dependent upon these general principles. Thus in discussing the need of Japan for a more extended territorial basis, he assumes that the Japanese will not or cannot cultivate their own country profitably. As an argument to support this charge, he adduces the solicitude of the Japanese government to improve agriculture, entirely overlooking the fact that, acre for acre, the Japanese lands are made to produce more than the lands of such prominent agricultural countries as Germany, France, Italy, India and Egypt. The author criticises Japan for landing soldiers in Korea and using that country for transit and for military operation. As Korea, however, was the main cause of warfare, nothing is more natural than that Japan should act quickly to prevent an occupation by Russia. The Japanese government in reply to charges of Russia said that it drew a "sharp distinction between the landing of the Japanese troops in Korea in the actual circumstances of the case, and the sending of large bodies of Russian troops to Manchuria while peaceful negotiations were still in prog-

ress." The author criticises the Japanese for invading neutral territory during the battle at Mukden, although, as is generally known and as he himself recounts, Russia had previously engaged in similar operations. He is full of suspicion concerning the motives of Japan with respect to Manchuria, stating his belief that Chinese authority would not be effectually restored, and speaking of numerous loopholes for equivocation in the Chino-Japanese treaty. Among the latter he mentions the fact that the peninsula on which Port Arthur is situated is described as Liaotung instead of Kwantung. As a matter of fact, it was always so described without further definition by the Russians, to whose rights the Japanese succeeded. But the author's apprehensions in this matter have since been falsified by the action of the Japanese government, in definitely fixing the territorial limits of their possession, an act which the Russians apparently never thought of. Among other views of the author with which the book is flavored are the belief that the Japanese were instrumental in furthering the Chinese boycott against American goods; that they entertain no ethical beliefs which they will not readily sacrifice to expediency; and that it would be far better for American interests to have Russia control Korea.

Though the author avows impartiality, his antagonism to the Japanese is so evident and his criticism of their national motives so one-sided as at times to become irritating to the reader. The author's insight into the shrewd calculations of international politics would seem to have restricted his vision and prevented him from giving their full importance to the broader aspects of the international situation. Thus he fails to recognize the fact that the war was to Japan a struggle for existence, fought close to her national territory, to which, in the event of ill success, it would have been immediately transferred with disastrous results to herself; while Russia was fighting for the conquest of territories far from the center of her national life. In attributing to Russia a desire for peace he forgets that she was in fact all the time acting in a decidedly hostile manner both to China and to Japan, and that it was the projection of Russian "interests" into Korea which caused the Japanese to realize that resistance to Russian encroachment could no longer safely be delayed. The high-handed manner of Russian diplomacy in the East would not have been endured by any self respecting independent nation whose interests were essentially involved.

Mr. Aubert's book gives us both clearer conceptions and more specific instances. His personal knowledge of the situation is less intimate, but, through his powers of analysis, he is enabled to illuminate the situation, and his statement of policies and conditions is statesmanlike. In the preface he speaks of the prevalent European ignorance of Japan. At the beginning of the war Europe was surprised by the rashness of the islanders. But when Japan had proved her force, she was accused of dissimulation and trickery for having deceived Europe so well. He compares the far better knowledge of things Japanese in America to the European ignorance in these matters, and explains the latter through the historic notions left behind by the Mongol invasion in Europe and through the long interruption of land communication between the two continents. The first chapter of the book is a study of advanced Japanese opinion on the foreign policy of the empire. The author's material is chiefly gained from Japanese newspapers and periodicals, and from the publications of such societies as the Kyoiku Koko (Society of Education) and the Tobo Kyokai (The Oriental Association). The ideas which these report take the following form. The peace of the Orient is threatened by the weakness of most of the Oriental nations, which encourages inroads on the part of European powers. If Oriental civilization is to be preserved, it is therefore necessary that an Oriental power should be strong enough to maintain order and to protect the Orient. Japan is evidently called to perform this service. In order to be able to do so, it is necessary that she should have a foothold on the mainland of Asia, *i. e.*, a controlling influence in Korea, and, in the opinion of some, even in Manchuria: The peace thus secured by the efforts of Japan through the establishment of a Monroe Doctrine for eastern Asia is the "Japanese peace" which the author is referring to in the title of his book. By the side of this extreme theory of the policy of Japan the author cites the more conservative expressions of statesmen like Marquis Ito. Some of the men whose opinions the author reports have since come into direct conflict with the government, through their denunciation of the moderateness of the terms of peace. In dealing with specific incidents the author is inclined to be fair to the Japanese. For the boycott he holds them responsible only very indirectly in that their victory stirred up the consciousness of Asian peoples. It is in fact a prime political interest of Japan that all disturbances should be avoided

which tend to invite further foreign interference. The author's account of the attitude of the American opinion towards Japan and Russia during the war is very informing, in that it shows the influence of historic relations and of literature upon national predilections. Although he deals with Russian policy only incidentally, his opinion of the exclusive economic system inaugurated in Manchuria before the war is by no means favorable.

Mr. Hishida's treatise is a historical account of the international relations of Japan. The history of Japan has not yet been scientifically sifted, and the author occasionally does not distinguish between tradition and history as in the case of the exploits of the Empress Jingo in Korea. He, however, makes good use of reliable secondary materials and gives a clear and interesting historical account. The more recent events are dealt with more directly from the sources, and the author gives a very satisfactory and impartial account of the treaty revision, as well as of the Korean question and the negotiations leading up to the war. Unhappily, however, he slurs over the part which the Japanese *soshi* played in the murder of the queen of Korea. The discussion of Korean neutrality and independence is satisfactory. The author does not go so far as some English authors in regarding the Korean protectorate as dating from before the war, and he cites with approval the opinion of Nakamura who regarded Korea as a *de facto* ally of Japan. He believes that the political interest of Japan in east Asia far transcends that of any European power, and states that Japan would be ready to assist Siam in maintaining its independence. Japan is disposed to defend China, "but should the Chinese again enter upon a course offensive to western civilization, Japan would coöperate with the Christian powers, as she did in 1900." This book, as do the others, shows that the times are past when Japan can be looked upon as an æsthetic plaything; at present she must be regarded as one of those great powers, whose actions are determined by national interests not always harmonious with each other.

PAUL S. REINSCH.

*Liberty, Union and Democracy.* By BARRETT WENDELL. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. Pp. 327.)

The work includes three essays on the subjects that form the general title, together with a prefatory essay on the National Character of America. The subjects are attractive to students of political